






























Revised October 2005 
 
 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS 
Research Division 
411 Locust Street 
St. Louis, MO 63102 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate 
discussion and critical comment. References in publications to Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working 
Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should be 
cleared with the author or authors. 
Photo courtesy of The Gateway Arch, St. Louis, MO.   www.gatewayarch.comDeterminacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia
James Bullard∗
Research Department
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
P.O. Box 442






Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX
United Kingdom
Telephone: +44 1784 443910
Email: Kaushik.Mitra@rhul.ac.uk
Fax: +44 1784 439534
Internet:
www.rhul.ac.uk/economics/About-Us/mitra.html
This version: 20 October 2005; revised†
Abstract. We show how monetary policy inertia can help alleviate prob-
lems of indeterminacy and non-existence of stationary equilibrium observed for some
commonly-studied monetary policy rules. We also ﬁnd that inertia promotes learn-
ability of equilibrium. The context is a simple, forward-looking model of the macro-
economy widely used in the rapidly expanding literature in this area. We conclude
that this might be an important reason why central banks in the industrialized
economies display considerable inertia when adjusting monetary policy in response
to changing economic conditions.
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1. Monetary policy advice
1.1. Determinacy. A fundamental issue in the evaluation of alternative monetary
policy rules is the question of whether a proposed policy rule is associated with a determi-
nate equilibrium or not. Starting with the work of Sargent and Wallace (1975), it has been
shown that certain types of policy rules may be associated with large sets of rational ex-
pectations equilibria (REE) and that some of these equilibria may involve ﬂuctuations in
variables like inﬂation and real output due solely to self-fulﬁlling expectations. Such rules
and the associated equilibria arguably ought to be avoided if one wishes to stabilize these
variables.1 Perhaps disconcertingly, this problem appears to be particularly acute for pol-
icy rules which may otherwise seem to be fairly realistic in terms of actual central bank
behavior. For example, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) have provided evidence which
suggests that monetary policy for the major industrialized countries since 1979 has been
forward-looking: Nominal interest rates are adjusted in response to anticipated inﬂation.
This empirical ﬁnding is somewhat puzzling in light of the fact that such forward-looking
rules are associated with equilibrium indeterminacy in many models (see, in particular,
Bernanke and Woodford (1997)). Similarly, in many models policy rules which call for the
monetary authority to respond aggressively to past values of endogenous variables (such
as the previous quarter’s deviations of inﬂation from a target level, or the output gap)
can be associated with explosive instability of rational expectations equilibrium. Yet at
the same time, such policy rules might also be viewed as fairly realistic in terms of ac-
tual central bank behavior in some contexts. Thus, at least two empirically relevant and
seemingly ordinary-looking classes of policy rules seem to be associated with important
theoretical problems.
These theoretical concerns impinge on the design of stabilization policy. Even aside
from broad modeling uncertainty, there is considerable sampling variability about the es-
timated parameters of a given model of the macroeconomy. When a candidate class of
policy rules may or may not generate indeterminacy, or explosive instability, depending
on the particular parameter values of the structural model and of the policy rule, it cre-
ates something of a mineﬁeld for policy design.2 One might, for instance, recommend a
particular rule on the basis that it would generate a determinate rational expectations
1Some of the authors that discuss this issue most recently include Bernanke and Woodford (1997),
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000), Christiano and Gust (1999), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), McCallum
and Nelson (1999), Rotemberg and Woodford (1998, 1999), and Woodford (2003).
2See, for example, the discussion in Christiano and Gust (1999).Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 2
equilibrium, and that the targeted equilibrium would have desirable properties based on
other criteria, such as utility of the representative household in the model. And yet, in
reality, important parameters may lie (because of sampling variability alone) in a region
associated with indeterminacy of equilibrium, or with explosive instability. Actually im-
plementing the proposed rule could then lead to disastrous consequences. Thus, from the
perspective of the design of stabilization policy, one would greatly prefer to recommend
policy rules such that, even if the structural parameters actually take on values some-
what diﬀerent from those that might be estimated, a determinate rational expectations
equilibrium is produced.
1.2. Learnability. Even when a determinate equilibrium exists, coordination on that
equilibrium cannot be assured if agents do not possess rational expectations at every point
in time. It therefore seems important to analyze these systems when agents must form
expectations concerning economic events using the actual data produced by the economy.
In general terms, the learning approach admits the possibility that expectations might
not initially be fully rational, and that, if economic agents make forecast errors and try
to correct them over time, the economy may or may not reach the REE asymptotically.
Thus, beyond showing that a particular policy rule reliably induces a determinate REE,
one needs to show the potential for agents to learn that equilibrium.3 In this paper,
we assume the agents of the model do not initially have rational expectations, and that
they instead form forecasts by using recursive learning algorithms–such as recursive least
squares–based on the data produced by the economy itself. We ask whether the agents in
such a world can learn the equilibria of the system induced by diﬀerent classes of monetary
policy feedback rules. We use the criterion of expectational stability (a.k.a. E-stability)
to calculate whether rational expectations equilibria are stable under real time recursive
learning dynamics or not. The research of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and Marcet
and Sargent (1989) has shown that the expectational stability of rational expectations
equilibrium governs local convergence of real time recursive learning algorithms in a wide
variety of macroeconomic models.
1.3. The beneﬁts of monetary policy inertia. We conclude that it is important
to recommend to central banks those policy rules which have desirable determinacy and
3See Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Evans and Honkapohja (2003a,b).Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 3
learnability properties, taking into consideration possible imprecision in our knowledge of
structural parameters. Our main ﬁnding is that a wide variety of monetary policy rules
are desirable in this sense provided the monetary authorities move cautiously in response
to unfolding events. This is true both from the point of view of determinacy and of
learnability of equilibrium. We model this caution, or inertia, on the part of the central
bank by allowing the contemporaneous interest rate to respond to the lagged interest rate
in the policy rule.
Inertia is a well-documented feature of central bank behavior in industrialized coun-
tries: Policymakers show a clear tendency to smooth out changes in nominal interest rates
in response to changes in economic conditions. Rudebusch (1995) has provided one statis-
tical analysis of this fact. More casually, actual policy moves are discussed among central
bankers and in the business press in industrialized countries as occurring as sequences of
adjustments in nominal interest rates in the same direction. This is so much the case, in
fact, that policy inertia has been the source of criticism of the eﬀorts of central bankers,
as suggestions are sometimes made that policymakers have been unwilling to move far
enough or fast enough to respond eﬀectively to incoming information about the economy.
Our study provides analytical support for the idea that monetary policy inertia en-
hances the prospects for equilibrium determinacy and learnability in the context of a
standard, small, forward-looking model which is currently the workhorse for the study
of monetary policy rules. More speciﬁcally, we consider two variants of monetary policy
feedback rules made famous by the seminal work of Taylor (1993, 1999a, 1999b). In one
case, the central bank is viewed as adjusting a short-term nominal interest rate in response
to deviations of past values of inﬂation and output from some target levels and, in order to
capture interest rate smoothing, we also include a response to the deviation of the lagged
interest rate from some target level. We call this the lagged data speciﬁcation. Our second
speciﬁcation calls for the policymakers to react to forecasts of inﬂation deviations and the
output gap, in addition to the lagged interest rate, and we call this the forward-looking
speciﬁcation.4
In previous studies it has been observed that there are important determinacy prob-
lems with both of these rules in the absence of inertia (see Bernanke and Woodford (1997),
Bullard and Mitra (2002), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), and Woodford (2003)). We
4We consider only these two classes of rules due to space constraints. We do discuss the robustness of
our results to a wider class of rules when appropriate.Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 4
ﬁnd that by placing a suﬃciently large weight on lagged interest rate deviations in each
of these classes of policy rules, the policy authorities can mitigate the threats of indeter-
minacy or explosive instability, and that this is one of the primary beneﬁts of monetary
policy inertia. We also argue that policy inertia actually promotes learnability of rational
expectations equilibrium. Our contribution is to provide analytical results to this eﬀect
and to highlight some of the intuition behind them.
1.4. Recent related literature. Our results suggest why other, non-inertial types
of policies might leave the economy vulnerable to unexpected dynamics, and hence why
central banks might willingly adopt inertial behavior. Recently, several very diﬀerent
theories have been proposed as to why policy inertia might be observed, for instance
Woodford (1999), Caplin and Leahy (1996), and Sack (1998). Our results are probably
best viewed as complementary to these theories.
Bullard and Mitra (2002) study the determinacy and learnability of simple monetary
policy rules, that is, of policy rules which only respond to inﬂation and output deviations,
but not to lagged interest rate deviations, and so do not comment on the question of
monetary policy inertia. Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) analyze learnability in a simi-
lar model, and consider diﬀerent ways of implementing optimal monetary policy under
discretion, which leads to non-inertial rules.5
The ﬁnding that interest-rate inertia is conducive to the existence of determinate
REE has been noted by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), Woodford (2003), Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2003), and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000). Our contribution
with regard to determinacy is to elaborate in greater detail the reasons for the numerical
ﬁndings in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and to show that the beneﬁcial eﬀects of
inertia are true for a wider class of policy rules than considered in Woodford (2003). In
addition, our results on determinacy are useful in understanding the eﬀects of inertia on
learning dynamics. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2003) ﬁnd support for super-
inertial interest rate policies in a somewhat diﬀerent class of models where a supply side
channel of monetary policy transmission is emphasized. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000)
consider models where the timing of money balances entering the utility function and the
nature of sticky price assumption along oﬀ-equilibrium paths is important. They ﬁnd that
5Evans and Honkapohja (2003b) provide a survey of the recent literature on learnability and monetary
policy.Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 5
inertial forward looking policies are subject to indeterminacy problems whereas backward
policies which react aggressively to past inﬂation can be associated with a determinate
equilibrium independently of the degree of inertia.
1.5. Organization. In the next section we present the model analyzed throughout
the paper. We also discuss the types of linear policy feedback rules we will use to organize
our analysis, and a calibrated case which we will occasionally employ. In the subsequent
sections, we present conditions for determinacy of equilibrium for the lagged and forward
looking policy rules. We then turn to the question of learnability of REE under our various
speciﬁcations. Section 5 considers the robustness of our results in Preston’s (2005a) model.
We conclude with a summary of our ﬁndings.
2. Environment
2.1. The model. We study a model developed by Woodford (2003) which we write
as
xt = ˆ Etxt+1 − σ
³
rt − rn
t − ˆ Etπt+1
´
(1)
πt = κxt + β ˆ Etπt+1 (2)
where xt is the output gap, πt is the period t inﬂation rate deﬁned as the percentage change
in the price level from t−1 to t,a n drt is the nominal interest rate; each of the two latter
variables are expressed as a deviation from the long run level. Since we will also analyze
learning we use the notation ˆ Etπt+1 and ˆ Etxt+1 to denote the possibly nonrational private
sector expectations of inﬂation and output gap next period, respectively, whereas the same
notation without the hat symbol will denote rational expectations (RE) values.6 The
parameters σ,κ,and β ∈ (0,1) are structural and assumed positive on economic grounds–
see Woodford (1999, 2003) for an interpretation of these constants. The “natural rate of
interest” rn
t is an exogenous stochastic term that follows the process
rn
t = ρrn
t−1 +  t (3)
where  t is i.i.d. noise with variance σ2
 , and 0 ≤ ρ<1 is a serial correlation parameter.
2.2. Alternative policy rules. We close the system by supplementing equations
(1), (2), and (3), which represent the behavior of the private sector, with a policy rule
6S e eS e c t i o n5f o rm o r ed i s c u s s i o no ft h er o l eo fe x p e c t a t i o n si nt h em o d e lu n d e ral e a r n i n ga s s u m p t i o n .Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 6
for setting the nominal interest rate representing the behavior of the monetary authority.
We stress that we view identiﬁcation of classes of rules that reliably produce determinacy
and learnability as a prior exercise to locating an optimal rule according to some objective
function assigned to the central bank. Once we isolate the characteristics of rules that
reliably produce both determinacy and learnability, then one could go about ﬁnding an
optimal or best-performing rule from among the ones in this set.
Taylor (1993,1999a) popularized the use of interest rate feedback rules that react to
information on output and inﬂation. Our ﬁrst speciﬁcation considers a case in which
interest rates are adjusted in response to last quarter’s observations on inﬂation and the
output gap. This is our lagged data speciﬁcation for our interest rate equation
rt = ϕππt−1 + ϕxxt−1 + ϕrrt−1. (4)
This speciﬁcation is considered operational by McCallum (1999) since it does not call for
the central bank to react to contemporaneous data on output and inﬂation deviations.
Our second speciﬁcation assumes that the authorities set their interest rate instrument
in response to their forecasts of output gap and inﬂation, so that the policy rule itself
is forward-looking. Forward-looking rules have been found to describe well the actual
behavior of monetary policymakers in countries like Germany, Japan, and the U.S. since
1979, as documented by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998). We consider a simple version
of this rule, namely7
rt = ϕπ ˆ Etπt+1 + ϕx ˆ Etxt+1 + ϕrrt−1. (5)
In the next section, we consider the determinacy of REE, and then we follow that with a
section analyzing the learnability of equilibrium. We maintain the following assumptions
throughout the paper: ϕπ ≥ 0 and ϕx ≥ 0, with at least one strictly positive, ϕr > 0,
κ>0,σ>0, and 0 <β<1. We sometimes illustrate our ﬁndings using Woodford’s
(1999) calibrated values, namely, β = .99,σ −1 = .157,κ= .024, and ρ = .35.
3. Inertia and determinacy
3.1. Lagged data in the policy rule. We start by considering the system when
the policymaker reacts to lagged values of inﬂation, output, and interest rate deviations.
7Similar interest rate rules also arise in the context of implementing optimal discretionary monetary
policies and nominal GDP targeting, see respectively Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) and Mitra (2003).
One interpretation for this rule is that both policymakers and private agents have homogeneous expecta-
tions and learning algorithms. Alternately, it may be that the central bank simply targets the predictions
of private sector forecasters. However, one can allow for some forms of heterogeneity in learning rules,
see Honkapohja and Mitra (2005a,2 0 0 5 b).Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 7
Non-inertial lagged data rules (that is, rules with ϕr =0 ) can easily lead to non-existence
of locally unique stationary solutions. Indeed, Bullard and Mitra (2002) note that a
suﬃciently aggressive response to inﬂation and output deviations invariably leads to such
a situation in quantitatively important portions of the parameter space.8 We now show
that this problem need not arise if the central bank displays suﬃcient inertia in setting
its interest rate.
In this case, our policy rule is given by equation (4), so that the complete system is
given by equations (1), (2), (3), and (4). If yt =( xt,πt,r t)0, then this system can be put














Since rt is predetermined while xt and πt are free, equilibrium is determinate if and only
if exactly one eigenvalue of B1 is inside the unit circle.9
Woodford (2003) provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for determinacy of equi-
librium in such a system. The details of these calculations are given in Appendix A. The
following two conditions together are shown there to be necessary for determinacy
κ(ϕπ + ϕr − 1) + (1 − β)ϕx > 0, (7)
[κσ +2 ( 1+β)]ϕr +2 ( 1+β) >σ [κ(ϕπ − 1) + (1 + β)ϕx]. (8)
The condition (7) is precisely what Woodford (2001, 2003) calls the Taylor principle,
whereby in the event of a permanent one percent rise in inﬂation, the cumulative increase
in the nominal interest rate is more than one percent. However, the Taylor principle in
general is not suﬃcient for determinacy, because another necessary condition for determi-
nacy is condition (8). This proves the following result:
Proposition 1. Assume that κ(ϕπ +ϕr −1)+(1−β)ϕx > 0 for the inertial lagged data
interest rule (4). Then a necessary condition for determinacy is
[κσ +2 ( 1+β)]ϕr +2 ( 1+β) >σ [κ(ϕπ − 1) + (1 + β)ϕx]. (9)
This proposition shows that the Taylor principle is not suﬃcient for determinacy, since
it is also necessary that the degree of inertia ϕr be large enough. If the central bank merely
8The interested reader can consult Figure 2 in that paper, or similarly Figure 2.15 of Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999). The analytical details for this result are in Proposition 11; see Appendix A.
9Our determinacy analysis follows the conventional practice of Blanchard and Kahn (1980).Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 8
responds vigorously to inﬂation and output without displaying enough inertia, then the
condition for determinacy may be violated.
Appendix A also shows that a set of necessary and suﬃcient conditions required for
determinacy reduce to (7), (8), and
ϕr > 2 − (1 + κσ)β
−1. (10)
The right hand expression in (10) is less than 1 since κ>0,σ>0, and 0 <β<1. These
conditions show that a large enough value of ϕr will always result in determinacy since
this contributes to satisfaction of all of the conditions (7), (8), and (10). A value of ϕr ≥ 1
always satisﬁes (7) and (10), so that if ϕr also satisﬁes condition (8), the conditions for
determinacy will be met. Hence, this proves:
Proposition 2. Assume that ϕr ≥ 1 for the inertial lagged data interest rule (4). Then
the necessary and suﬃcient condition for determinacy is
[κσ +2 ( 1+β)]ϕr +2 ( 1+β) >σ [κ(ϕπ − 1) + (1 + β)ϕx]. (11)
The analytical results given above provide intuition for a number of results obtained in
more complicated forward-looking models. For instance, Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)
found that large values of ϕr tend to be associated with a unique equilibrium. This is
easily explained by conditions (7), (8), and (10) which are suﬃcient for a determinate
outcome. Values of ϕr ≥ 1 automatically satisfy condition (7), and condition (10) along
with small values of κ, such as the one employed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999),
help to satisfy condition (8) easily. McCallum and Nelson (1999, pp. 34-35) found that
policy rules with large values of ϕπ or ϕx deliver dynamically stable (in their terminology)
results, so long as there is a suﬃcient level of monetary policy inertia. Their explanation
for this surprising ﬁnding was in terms of relatively small values of σ and κ, and can be
understood from our condition (8). Relatively small values of σ and κ mean that condition
(8) is likely to be easily satisﬁed.10
3.2. Forward-looking policy rule. With the forward-looking rule (5), we deﬁne
yt =( xt,πt,r t−1)0 and put the system in the form ˆ Etyt+1 = Byt + ςrn
t , where




−1κσ(ϕπ − 1) β
−1σ(ϕπ − 1) σϕr
−β





−1(ϕπ − ϕxσ) ϕr
⎤
⎦. (12)
10Propositions 1 and 2 may give the impression that the Taylor principle is always necessary for deter-
minacy. However, this is not true. See Proposition 11 in Appendix A.Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 9
Since rt−1 is pre-determined and xt,πt are free, equilibrium is determinate if and only if
exactly one eigenvalue of B is inside the unit circle. As shown in Bernanke and Woodford
(1997) and Bullard and Mitra (2002), a suﬃciently aggressive response to inﬂation or
output leads to indeterminacy with the rule (5) when ϕr =0 . We now turn to showing
how this problem can be circumvented when policymakers adopt a suﬃciently aggressive
response to the lagged interest rate.11
The ﬁrst proposition shows that if the response to the output gap ϕx is not large,
then necessary conditions for determinacy are given by conditions (7) and (8). More
speciﬁcally,
Proposition 3. Assume that ϕx < 2σ−1 for the inertial forward looking policy rule (5).
Then conditions (7) and (8) are necessary for determinacy.12
This again shows that the Taylor principle in general is not suﬃcient for determinacy,
as a high degree of inertia is also necessary. In addition, we have
Proposition 4. Assume that ϕr ≥ 1 for the inertial forward looking policy rule (5).
Then the necessary and suﬃcient condition for determinacy is (8).
The same proposition was proved for rules responding to lagged data (Proposition
2). These results show that for given values of ϕπ and ϕx, a large enough value of ϕr is
invariably associated with determinacy.
3.3. Summary of the results on determinacy. We have seen the beneﬁcial eﬀects
of a large degree of inertia in promoting determinacy for the lagged data rule and the
forward looking rule. We stress that the same cannot be said for the response to inﬂa-
tion or output in the interest rule–a response which is too aggressive with respect to
either of these variables may lead to problems of non-existence of stationary REE, or to
indeterminacy of REE. The tendency of policy inertia to help generate determinacy may
be an important reason why so much inertia is observed in the actual monetary policies
of industrialized countries. However, too much policy inertia may cause another type of
instability–that of the learning dynamics. We now turn to this topic.
11Woodford (2003) has considered the determinacy analysis of a variant of the forward rule where the
interest rate responds to expected inﬂation and the current output gap.
12To economize on space, we state this and the next propostion without proof. The proofs may be
obtained from the authors upon request.Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 10
4. Inertia and learnability
4.1. Lagged data in the policy rule.
The system under learning. We now consider learning, beginning with the case
in which the policy authority responds to lagged data.13 In this case, the complete
system is given by equations (1), (2), (3), and (4). We analyze the expectational stability
of stationary minimum state variable (MSV) solutions (see McCallum (1983)). For the
analysis of learning, we need to compute the MSV solution and for this we need to
obtain a relationship between the current endogenous variables (and their lags) and future
expectations. This relationship is now obtained by ﬁrst deﬁning the vector of endogenous



















The MSV solution for this model takes the form
yt =¯ a +¯ byt−1 +¯ crn
t (15)
with ¯ a =0 , and with ¯ b and ¯ c given by
¯ b =( I − Ω¯ b)−1δ, (16)
¯ c =( I − Ω¯ b)−1(κ + ρΩ¯ c), (17)
provided the matrix (I − Ω¯ b) is invertible. Equation (16) potentially yields multiple
solutions for ¯ b and the determinate case corresponds to the situation when there is a
unique solution for ¯ b with all eigenvalues inside the unit circle. For the analysis of learning,
we assume that agents have a perceived law of motion (PLM) of the form
yt = a + byt−1 + crn
t (18)
corresponding to the MSV solution. We then compute the following expectation (assuming
that the time t information set does not include yt)
ˆ Etyt+1 = a + b ˆ Etyt + cρrn
t =( I + b)a + b2yt−1 +( bc + cρ)rn
t . (19)
13Our analysis of learning is standard and follows Evans and Honkapohja (2001), Chapter 10.Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 11
Substituting these computed expectations into the model one obtains an actual law of
motion (ALM)
yt =( Ω + Ωb)a +( Ωb2 + δ)yt−1 +( Ωbc + Ωcρ + κ)rn
t . (20)
T h em a p p i n gf r o mt h eP L Mt ot h eA L Mt a k e st h ef o r m
T(a,b,c)=( [ Ω + Ωb]a, Ωb2 + δ,Ωbc + Ωcρ + κ). (21)
Expectational stability is then determined by the matrix diﬀerential equation
d
dτ
(a,b,c)=T (a,b,c) − (a,b,c). (22)
The ﬁxed points of equation (22) give us the MSV solution (¯ a,¯ b,¯ c).W e s a y t h a t a
particular MSV solution (¯ a,¯ b,¯ c) is expectationally stable if the MSV ﬁxed point of the
diﬀerential equation (22) is locally asymptotically stable at that point. Our system is in
a form where we can apply the results of Evans and Honkapohja (2001). It can then be
shown that for E-stability of any MSV solution, assuming that the time t information set
is (1,y0
t−1,r n
t )0, the eigenvalues of the matrices
¯ b0 ⊗ Ω + I ⊗ Ω¯ b − I, (23)
ρΩ + Ω¯ b − I, (24)
Ω + Ω¯ b − I, (25)
need to have negative real parts (where I denotes a conformable identity matrix). If any
eigenvalue of the above matrices has a positive real part, then the MSV solution is not
E-stable. Even small expectational errors w o u l dt e n dt od r i v et h es y s t e ma w a yf r o mt h e
REE. We emphasize that the MSV solution for ¯ b directly aﬀects the E-stability conditions
and this is the key to understanding the results under learning.
A quantitative case. We illustrate regions of determinacy and E-stability for the
case when the policy authorities react to lagged data in Figure 1 where we have em-
ployed the baseline parameter values. Figure 1 contains three panels, the ﬁrst of which
corresponds to the case where there is no policy inertia, so that ϕr =0 .T h e ﬁgure is
drawn in (ϕπ,ϕ x) space, holding all other parameters at their baseline values. Vertical
lines in the ﬁgure denote parameter combinations that generate determinacy, and that
also generate local stability in the learning dynamics. Horizontal lines, on the other hand,Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 12
Figure 1: With ϕr =0 , the region of the parameter space associated with both determinate and
learnable rational exepectations equilibria involves relatively small values for ϕx,a n dg e n e r a l l y
ϕπ > 1. In the blank region, determinacy does not hold. When ϕr = .65, which is close to
empirical estimates in the literature, the region of the parameter space associated with determi-
nacy and learnability expands, relative to the no inertia case. For a large value of ϕr, such as
ϕr =5as shown here, much of the pictured (ϕπ,ϕ x) space is associated with both determinacy
and learnability.
indicate parameter combinations that generate determinacy, but where the unique equi-
librium is unstable in the learning dynamics. In this and all ﬁgures, the blank region is
not associated with determinacy.
The ϕr =0portion of this ﬁgure illustrates that determinacy does not always imply
learnability. It also illustrates that Taylor-type rules which react aggressively to inﬂation,
but with little or no reaction to the output gap or the lagged interest rate, tend to be
associated with both determinacy and learnability. However, one concern regarding this
panel might be that parameter values within an empirically relevant range are sometimes
associated with equilibria which are not determinate, or which are determinate but not
learnable.
The second panel of Figure 1 illustrates how the situation is improved when the de-
gree of monetary policy inertia is increased from zero to ϕr = .65. This value is close to
estimates of the degree of policy inertia based on U.S. postwar data, such as Sack (1998).
In this case, the region of the (ϕπ,ϕ x) space associated with both determinacy and learn-
ability of equilibrium has been enlarged. The region associated with determinate, but
unlearnable, rational expectations equilibria has been eliminated. This eﬀect becomesDeterminacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 13
even more pronounced in the third panel, where a very large value of ϕr is employed,
speciﬁcally, ϕr =5 . In this case, a much larger portion of the space is determinate and
learnable. We conclude that larger degrees of policy inertia enhance the prospects for
determinacy considerably, relative to the case where there is no policy inertia at all, in
this quantitative case. In addition, learnability does not appear to be jeopardized by large
degrees of policy inertia, as the determinate equilibria are also learnable, even when ϕr is
large.
Intuition and analytics. We now provide some intuition and analytics for the
phenomenon illustrated in Figure 1. We begin with a discussion of non-inertial, ϕr =0 ,
policy rules. The triangular region in the left hand panel of Figure 1 shows that there are
determinate equilibria which are E-unstable in this case. We ﬁrst provide intuition for
this phenomenon. When ϕr =0 , the reduced form model with the interest rate rule (4)













where yt =[ xt,πt]
0. The MSV solution continues to take the form (15) with the same
solutions for ¯ a (=0 ) , and ¯ b, ¯ c given by (16) and (17). It is the feedback from lagged en-
dogenous variables (via ¯ b) in the stationary MSV solution that is the key to understanding
E-instability of determinate equilibria.







where bxπ = ϕπϕ−1
x bxx,b πx = ϕxϕ−1
π bππ (assuming ϕx,ϕ π > 0), and bxx and bππ can
be computed from equation (16); see Appendix B. Written explicitly, this MSV solution
takes the form
xt = bxxxt−1 + bxππt−1 + ... (28)
πt = bπxxt−1 + bπππt−1 + ... (29)
Here the three elipses denote terms involving shocks not needed for our analysis. We
conclude that ¯ b in (27) is singular, and that |bxx + bππ| < 1 is required for stationarity of
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We ﬁrst provide an economic interpretation of E-stability. The nature of the MSV
solution is crucial for E-stability since we start the system not at the REE but from
within a small neighborhood of the REE of interest. If bxx and bππ are positive (so
that bxπ and bπx are positive as well), then the MSV solution (28)-(29) has a perverse
feature. This feature is that while an increase in either lagged output or inﬂation raises
the nominal interest rate, the increase in the nominal interest rate is not large enough (i.e.,
the real interest rate falls). Consequently, current output and inﬂation actually increase
which further enhances inﬂationary pressures if one starts away from the REE. If, on the
other hand, agents do have rational expectations, then their beliefs will exactly match
realizations and this equilibrium will be the unique one in this parameter range. It is only
when agents do not have RE to start with that there will be pressure to move further
away from these determinate REE owing to the perverse nature of the solution. Dynamics
along oﬀ-equilibrium paths is important for E-stability but not for determinacy.
We now turn to the analytical details behind E-stability. To examine what type of
MSV solutions can be E-stable, we ﬁrst note that a necessary condition for E-stability is
that the eigenvalues of Ω + Ω¯ b − I have negative real parts and for this, the determinant
of Ω + Ω¯ b − I, given by
−bxx(1 − β + κϕπϕ−1
x ) − bππ(κ + ϕxϕ−1
π )σ − κσ, (30)
must be positive. This shows that it is necessary for at least one of bxx or bππ to be
negative for E-stability since otherwise this determinant will be negative. In other words,
if both bxx and bππ are positive, the MSV solution will necessarily be E-unstable verifying
the economic intuition outlined above.
This is precisely what happens in the triangular determinate but E-unstable region
of Figure 1. This region corresponds to the violation of the Taylor principle and the
necessary and suﬃcient condition for determinacy in this case is given by condition (55)
in Proposition 11 (but with ϕr =0for this discussion). It can be easily checked that the
unique stationary solution for ¯ b in this region involves bxx > 0 and bππ > 0 which makes
this solution E-unstable. As long as ϕr is suﬃciently small, the existence of a determinate
equilibrium does not preclude a solution for ¯ b with both bxx and bππ positive. As a result,
a triangular determinate but E-unstable region continues to exist for small ϕr; however
the size of this region shrinks as ϕr increases eventually being eliminated.
The determinate and E-stable region when ϕr =0 , on the other hand, satisﬁes theDeterminacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 15
Taylor principle and it can be checked numerically that these regions are characterized
by MSV solutions where bxx and bππ (and hence bxπ and bπx) are all negative.I nt h e s e
solutions, an increase in either lagged output or inﬂation increases both the nominal
and the real interest rate so that contemporaneous output and inﬂation fall pushing the
economy back towards the initial equilibrium even when agents start outside the REE
and are learning using recursive least squares.









with bxx = ϕxϕ−1
r bxr,b xπ = ϕπϕ−1
r bxr,b πx = ϕxϕ−1
r bπr, and bππ = ϕπϕ−1
r bπr; see
Appendix C. Consequently, once bxr and bπr are known, the remaining unknowns can be
determined from them numerically. Written explicitly the MSV solution is of the form
xt = bxxxt−1 + bxππt−1 + bxrrt−1 + ... (32)
πt = bπxxt−1 + bπππt−1 + bπrrt−1 + ... (33)
where the interest rate rule in the MSV solution is (4). A necessary condition for Ω+Ω¯ b−I
to have eigenvalues with negative real parts (that is, for E-stability) is that a2,d e ﬁned as
a2 = −[(1 − β)ϕx + κϕπ]ϕ−1
r bxr − σ(ϕx + κϕπ)ϕ−1
r bπr − κσ, (34)
be positive; see Appendix D for the details. This implies that at least one of bxr or bπr
must be negative for E-stability. This proves:
Proposition 5. A necessary condition for an MSV solution with the lagged data interest
rule (4) to be E-stable is that either bxr < 0 or bπr < 0.
Proposition 5 shows that any MSV solution with both bxr and bπr positive is E-
unstable regardless of the degree of inertia in the policy rule. The economic intuition
runs parallel to the case of the non-inertial, ϕr =0 , rule. E-stability rules out a perverse
(positive) eﬀect of the lagged interest rate on contemporaneous output and inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
MSV solution which is important for oﬀ-equilibrium dynamics. If agents are learning, then
this MSV solution should have the right properties to enable them to converge to the REE
of interest. If bxr and bπr are both strictly positive, then an increase in the interest rate
by the monetary authority (due to an increase in inﬂationary pressures in the economy)Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 16
will be insuﬃciently large, actually raising future inﬂation and output further worsening
these inﬂationary pressures. This in turn would raise expectations of inﬂation and output
gap of private agents further increasing inﬂation and pushing the economy away from the
REE, even if initially agents had started from a small neighborhood of this REE.
We emphasize that this intuition is relevant for low levels of monetary policy inertia.
The situation changes markedly when the degree of inertia is large. It is easy to check
that two of the eigenvalues of ¯ b in (31) at the MSV solution are zero and the third one is
given by ϕr +ϕxϕ−1
r bxr +ϕπϕ−1
r bπr. Existence of a stationary solution for ¯ b is, therefore,
equivalent to the requirement that
−(1 + ϕr)ϕr <ϕ xbxr + ϕπbπr < (1 − ϕr)ϕr. (35)
Without any further calculations, the right hand inequality in (35) immediately demon-
strates that if ϕr ≥ 1, a necessary condition for stationarity is that at least one of bxr or
bπr (i.e., bxx or bππ) be negative. Hence, we have the following:
Proposition 6. Assume that ϕr ≥ 1. A necessary condition for an MSV solution with
the lagged data interest rule (4) to be stationary is that either bxr < 0 or bπr < 0.
In other words, a high degree of inertia precludes a stationary MSV solution with
both bxr and bπr positive. Earlier, we saw that for a small degree of inertia, determinate
equilibria with positive values of both bxr and bπr satisfying (35) existed. These solutions
were E-unstable by Proposition 5. We conclude that it is only with a high degree of
inertia that the necessary conditions for both determinacy and E-stability coincide.
Imposing more conditions in the high inertia case enables us to provide a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for E-stability below. One can check numerically that super-inertial
rules (that is, rules with ϕr ≥ 1) lead to determinate MSV solutions with both bxr and bπr
negative.14 Appendix D shows that if the degree of inertia is large enough, the necessary
and suﬃcient condition for E-stability simpliﬁes to the one given in the following:
Proposition 7. Assume that ϕr ≥ 1 for the lagged interest rule (4) and consider a
stationary MSV solution (i.e., one satisfying (35)) with bxr < 0 and bπr < 0.L e tσϕx +
14We are unable to prove this result analytically, that is, that ϕr ≥ 1 implies bxr < 0 and bπr < 0.
However, this can be easily checked numerically for plausible values of parameters (including the baseline
values in Table 1) and is the basis for Proposition 7 below.Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 17
(β + κσ − 1)ϕπ ≥ 0 and
ϕ+
r ≡ 2−1β
−1[1 + β + κσ +
p
(1 + β + κσ)2 − 4β] > 1. (36)
Then if ϕr ≥ Max{β +κσ,ϕ+
r }, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for E-stability is15
−[(1 − β)ϕx + κϕπ]ϕ−1
r bxr − σ(ϕx + κϕπ)ϕ−1
r bπr >κ σ . (37)
We stress that bxr < 0 and bπr < 0 per se do not suﬃce for condition (37) to be
satisﬁed. As it turns out, numerically, the determinate MSV solutions with super-inertial
rules satisfy condition (37) and all such solutions are E-stable. In other words, an increase
in interest rate should exert a strong dampening inﬂuence on inﬂation and output to reduce
inﬂationary pressures in the economy and enable a return to the REE of interest.
4.2. Forward expectations in the policy rule.
The system under learning. With forward expectations the complete system is
given by equations (1), (2), (3), and (5). We analyze E-stability of the MSV solution.
After deﬁning the vector of endogenous variables, yt =( xt,πt,r t)0, we put our system in
the form yt = Ω ˆ Etyt+1 + δyt−1 + κrn




σ(σ−1 − ϕx) σ(1 − ϕπ)0












The MSV solutions take the same form (15) as in the case of lagged data, and the analy-
sis of learning is also the same. Hence, assuming that the time t information set is
(1,y0
t−1,r n
t )0, E-stability of any MSV solution requires that the eigenvalues of the matri-
ces (23), (24) and (25) have negative real parts.
A quantitative case. Figure 2 illustrates how, even for this case where the pol-
icymakers are reacting to expectations of future inﬂation deviations and output gaps,
policy inertia tends to enhance the prospects for determinacy and learnability of a REE.
For low values of ϕr, such as the value ϕr =0 .1 in the ﬁrst panel, we again ﬁnd that
15We note that β+κσ > 1, which suﬃces for σϕx+(β+κσ−1)ϕπ ≥ 0, is generally satisﬁed for plausible
values of structural parameters since the discount factor β is close to 1 (including the baseline values). In
addition, for the baseline values, ϕ+
r =1 .48. We conjecture that the condition ϕr ≥ Max{β + κσ,ϕ+
r }
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Figure 2: For small values of ϕr, forward-looking policy rules generate determinacy and learn-
ability provided ϕπ > 1 and ϕx is suﬃciently small. For ϕr = .65, al a r g e rr e g i o no ft h e
(ϕπ,ϕ x) space pictured is associated with both determinacy and learnability. Large values of
ϕr generate relatively large regions of determinacy and learnability in (ϕπ,ϕ x) space.
active Taylor-type rules with little or no reaction to other variables are associated with
both determinacy and learnability of equilibrium. However, the large region in the ﬁgure
which is not associated with determinacy might be enough to limit recommendations of
such rules because of uncertainty about parameter values. The second and third panels of
Figure 2 show that increased policy inertia can mitigate such concerns, creating a larger
region of determinacy, and in addition, that in these cases determinate equilibria are also
learnable.
Intuition and analytics. We now provide some intuition and analytics for the
phenomena illustrated in Figure 2. As before, it is the MSV solution for ¯ b which is crucial
for E-stability. To gain further understanding, we ﬁrst explore the type of stationary
solutions permissible. Since it is only the lagged interest rate which appears in the model,
the MSV solutions written explicitly take the form
xt = bxrt−1 + ..., (40)
πt = bπrt−1 + ..., (41)
rt = brrt−1 + ..., (42)Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 19
where bx,b π, and br are to be determined by solving the system of equations (16); see
Appendix E for details. Assuming that Det[I − Ω¯ b]=1− bxϕx − bπϕπ 6=0 ,t h es o l u t i o n
for br is given by
br = ϕr(1 − bxϕx − bπϕπ)−1. (43)
We ﬁrst consider a necessary condition for an MSV solution to be E-stable which is proved
in Appendix F.
Proposition 8. A necessary condition for E-stability of the MSV solution, (40)-(42),
associated with the forward looking interest rule (5) is that bxϕx + bπϕπ < 1 (which is
equivalent to br > 0 by (43)).
Once again, E-stability imposes restrictions on the parameters involved in the MSV
solution, independently of the degree of inertia in the policy rule. In particular, it imposes
the restriction that a rise in the current interest rate should necessarily lead to a rise in
the future interest rate in the MSV solution. Intuitively, when br > 0, an (unexpected)
rise in inﬂationary pressures causes the interest rate to rise today, which in turn raises the
interest rate tomorrow. This rise creates downward pressure on aggregate demand and
inﬂation reducing the inﬂationary pressures and pushing the economy back towards the
REE. If instead br < 0, then the rise in the interest rate reduces the rate tomorrow and
raises the output gap or inﬂation (since at least one of bx or bπ must then be positive)
which worsens the inﬂationary pressures pushing the economy further away from the REE.
This intuition is similar to that associated with the lagged data rule.
As in the case of lagged data, we examine the type of MSV solutions that can be
stationary and compare them with the E-stability conditions. The following proposition
is proved in Appendix E.
Proposition 9. Assume that ϕr ≥ 1. The MSV solution, (40)-(42), associated with
the forward looking interest rule (5), is stationary if and only if either of the following
conditions hold:
bxϕx + bπϕπ > 1+ϕr (which implies br < 0), (44)
bxϕx + bπϕπ < 1 − ϕr (which implies br > 0). (45)
In other words, even with a high degree of inertia, a stationary MSV solution is ap r i o r i
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be in the determinate or indeterminate region of the parameter space. But as in the case
of lagged data, a stationary solution with br < 0 implies a perverse relation in the sense
explained above. Proposition 8 immediately shows that the stationary MSV solutions
possible under Proposition 9 when br < 0 are always E-unstable. Such solutions do exist
in the indeterminate region of the parameter space as will be shown below. Hence, the
only stationary MSV solutions which can be E-stable when ϕr ≥ 1 are the ones with
br > 0.
To gain further intuition, consider the case when ϕx =0 . Appendix E provides the
details in this case. The MSV solution(s) for bπ are then given by a cubic polynomial. A
negative solution for bπ exists (implying br > 0) which satisﬁes (83) when ϕr + ϕπ > 1.
Also, if condition (8) in Proposition 4 is violated (with ϕx =0 ) , then another stationary
solution for bπ exists that has bπ > 0 (implying br < 0) satisfying condition (82). The
latter solution is E-unstable by Proposition 8.
A determinate solution under the conditions given in Proposition 4 involves bπ < 0,
bx < 0, and 0 <b r < 1. Super-inertial rules, therefore, cause the determinate REE to
have the property that a rise in the lagged interest rate of one percentage point causes
a rise in the current interest rate of less than one percent, that is, 0 <b r < 1. In other
words, a high degree of inertia rules out the stationary MSV solutions with br < 0 that
would necessarily be E-unstable by Proposition 8, and instead only permits stationary
solutions with 0 <b r < 1 which can be E-stable.
Appendix F shows that the determinate MSV solution is E-stable when ϕr is large
enough. First, we recall Proposition 4 which stated that if ϕr ≥ 1, then condition (8) is
necessary and suﬃcient for determinacy. In particular, Appendix F proves the following:
Proposition 10. Assume that ϕx =0and that the conditions in Proposition 4 for
determinacy hold i.e., that ϕr ≥ 1 and condition (8) holds for the forward rule (5).
Then if ϕr ≥ Max{1,β+ κσ}, the determinate equilibria are E-stable.
The intuition behind this result follows from our discussion. A high degree of inertia
forces the determinate MSV solution to have the property that bπ < 0,b x < 0, and
0 <b r < 1 which results in E-stability.16
16When ϕx > 0, it is easy to check numerically that if the policy rule is super-inertial, then the
determinate solutions involve bπ < 0,b x < 0, and 0 <b r < 1 w h i c ht h e ni m p l i e sE-stability of the
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4.3. Alternative policy rules. Increasing the degree of monetary policy inertia ap-
pears to also be associated with learnability of rational expectations equilibrium in our
setting. We considered only two types of (albeit plausible) interest rate rules primarily
because of space constraints. However, similar results extend to other rules not reported
here. In particular, this is true for rules responding to contemporaneous values of inﬂa-
tion, output, and the lagged interest rate as well as to contemporaneous expectations of
inﬂation and output and the lagged interest rate–in either case, a high degree of inertia
results in E-stability of the determinate REE.17
5. The infinite horizon model
It has been standard in the learning literature since Marcet and Sarget (1989) to replace
rational expectations agents with adaptive learners. In this paper we follow this standard,
taking Woodford’s basic two equations for output and inﬂation under rational expectations
(RE) and replacing RE by arbitrary subjective expectations in equations (1) and (2).
Honkapohja, Mitra, and Evans (2003) call this the Euler equation approach and note that
only one period ahead forecasts of output and inﬂation matter. They discuss how the
Euler equation approach can be a plausible model of bounded rationality.
Recently, Preston (2005a,b) has argued for an alternative representation of Woodford’s
model under arbitrary subjective expectations. Preston derives the model under bounded
rationality starting at the individual household and ﬁrm levels and obtains equations for
agents’ consumption and price setting that depend on forecasts into the entire inﬁnite
future; Honkapohja, Mitra, and Evans (2003) call this the inﬁnite horizon approach.
This is an interesting contribution, and we now turn to a discussion of how our results
concerning inertia might be aﬀected by taking this alternative viewpoint on bounded
rationality.
Preston (2005a) shows that his model can be reduced to the following two equations
for output and inﬂation









17As discussed in Evans and Honkapohja (2001), E-stability conditions are in general sensitive to
the information agents use in forming their forecasts. However, if we assume instead that agents use
contemporaneous values of inﬂation and output in forming their forecasts (which McCallum (1999) would
label non-operational, since such information is not normally available in actual economies), then a high
degree of inertia continues to result in E-stability of the determinate REE.Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 22




(αβ)T−t[καβxT+1 +( 1− α)βπT+1)]
)
. (47)
T ot h e s ee q u a t i o n s ,o n ec a na d j o i na ne q u a t i o n for the interest rate rule such as (4) or (5).
We will conduct our analysis for the model (46) and (47) using the forward looking rule,
(5), for illustrative purposes. For simplicity, we also assume that rn
t is i.i.d. The MSV
solution for the model continues to be of the form (15). Agents estimate a linear model
yt = at + btyt−1 + ctrn
t +  t
as before, where yt =( xt,πt,r t)0,  t is the error term, and at,b t, and ct are estimated
from actual data. For the E-stability analysis, we may assume the estimated parameters























Agents compute the forecasts required in (46) and (47) by the following formula (T ≥ t+1)
ˆ EtyT =( I − b)−1(I − bT−t+1)a + bT−t+1yt−1 + bT−tcrn
t . (49)
Using these forecasts, the ALM can be computed as
yt = Xa + Xbyt−1 + Xcrn
t . (50)
where the coeﬃcients in (50) are deﬁned in Appendix G. The parameters a,b,c in the
PLM (18) are mapped into the parameters Xa,X b, and Xc in the ALM (50) and the ﬁxed
points of this map correspond to the MSV solution. The mapping from the PLM to the
ALM can be analyzed for E-stability as before.
There are two scenarios which can be considered as discussed in Preston (2005b). The
ﬁrst scenario is where agents know the policy rule (5) and use this rule to form forecasts.
The output gap equation is then given by (117) and the whole system by (118) in Appendix
G. For the baseline Woodford parameters, the beneﬁcial eﬀects of inertia extend to the
inﬁnite horizon model as in the Euler equation model. Large degrees of inertia in the
interest rule lead to determinacy and E-stability.
There is an alternative scenario which can be considered as discussed in Preston
(2005b). This is the case where agents do not know (understand) the interest rate rule
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equation in this case is given by (119) and the whole system by (120) in Appendix G. The
results now change dramatically. Inertia is no longer suﬃcient to guarantee E-stability.
One has E-instability even with large degrees of inertia. These results are similar in ﬂavor
to those in Preston (2005b). He too ﬁnds that certain forecast-based interest rules lead to
E-stability when agents are endowed with knowledge of the policy rule and to E-instability
when agents do not have this knowledge. As Preston discusses in some detail, this points
to the virtues of transparency in policy formulation which has been emphasized in the
recent literature of monetary policy.
6. Conclusion
Two key issues for the evaluation of monetary policy rules are whether they induce a
determinate rational expectations equilibrium or not, and whether that equilibrium is
learnable or not. We provide analytical results which indicate how an increased degree of
interest rate smoothing may induce both determinacy and learnability of rational expec-
tations equilibrium in a widely-used model of monetary policy. This is true across both of
our speciﬁcations of monetary policy rules–a ﬁnding which we believe substantially alters
the evaluation of these rules. Consequently, neither of these classes of policy rules–which
might be considered particularly realistic in terms of actual central bank behavior–should
be deemed undesirable on account of determinacy or learnability questions, once policy
inertia is taken into account.
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7. Appendices
7.1. APPENDIX A (Determinacyw i t hL a g g e dD a t aR u l e ). Woodford (2003)
provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for determinacy of the system under a lagged
data policy rule. Appendix C, Proposition C.2, in Woodford (2003) lists three possible
sets of (mutually disjoint) conditions in terms of the characteristic polynomial of B1 under
which determinacy obtains. Speciﬁcally, he shows that a 3 × 3 matrix has exactly one
eigenvalue inside the unit circle and the remaining two outside if and only if one of three
cases holds. The cases are labelled I, II, and III. We will apply these conditions to B1.
First, note that the characteristic polynomial of B1 (given in (6)), p(λ), is given by
p(λ)=λ
3 + A2λ
2 + A1λ + A0 (51)
where A2 = −(1+β
−1+β
−1κσ+ϕr),A 1 = β
−1+(1+β
−1+β
−1κσ)ϕr −σϕx, and A0 =
β
−1σ(κϕπ+ϕx−σ−1ϕr). We have p(1) = 1+A2+A1+A0 and p(−1) = −1+A2−A1+A0,
so that
p(1) = β
−1σ[κ(ϕπ + ϕr − 1) + (1 − β)ϕx], (52)
p(−1) = β
−1σ[κ(ϕπ − ϕr − 1) + (1 + β)ϕx − 2σ−1(1 + β)(1 + ϕr)]. (53)
Conditions (C.13) and (C.14) in Woodford (2003) are necessary for both Cases II and III
(and they also rule out Case I). These two conditions are that p(1) > 0 and p(−1) < 0,
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The conditions required for Case III of Woodford are (C.13), (C.14), and (C.17), i.e.,
|A2| > 3. The ﬁnal condition corresponds to (10) since
|A2| =1+β
−1 + β
−1κσ + ϕr > 3 (54)
iﬀ condition (10) holds. This supplies the details behind Proposition 2.
We also state a proposition (without proof) which provides the required conditions for
determinacy w h e nt h ed e g r e eo fi n e r t i ai sl o w .
Proposition 11. Assume that κ(ϕπ + ϕr − 1) + (1 − β)ϕx < 0 for the inertial lagged
data interest rule (4). Then the necessary and suﬃcient condition for determinacy is
[κσ +2 ( 1+β)]ϕr +2 ( 1+β) <σ [κ(ϕπ − 1) + (1 + β)ϕx]. (55)
Note that condition (55) represents violation of condition (9) in Proposition 1. In
particular, it can be shown that if ϕr =0 , the necessary and suﬃcient condition for
determinacy is given by18
(1 + β)−1[κ(1 − ϕπ)+2 ( 1+β)σ−1] <ϕ x < (1 − β)−1κ(1 − ϕπ). (56)
7.2. APPENDIX B (MSV Solution for Non-Inertial Lagged Data Rule). In
this case, assuming that D ≡ bxx(1 − βbππ)+( β + κσ)bππ + βbxπbπx + κbxπ + σbπx −
1 6=0 , the MSV parameter values are given by the solution to the equations bxx =
[(1 − βbππ)σϕx]D−1,b xπ =[ ( 1− βbππ)σϕπ]D−1,b πx =[ ( κ + βbπx)σϕx]D−1, and bππ =
[(κ+βbπx)σϕπ]D−1. These four equations yield bxπ = ϕπϕ−1
x bxx and bπx = ϕxϕ−1
π bππ so
that this system can be reduced to two (nonlinear) equations in two unknowns which can
be solved numerically. In general, there are three solutions for ¯ b of which exactly one is
stationary in the determinate region.
7.3. APPENDIX C (MSV Solution for Inertial Lagged Data Rule). We now
consider the situation when ϕr > 0 in the lagged data rule. Assuming that I − Ω¯ b is
invertible, we solve the system ¯ b =( I − Ω¯ b)−1δ for the MSV solution, with ¯ b a 3 × 3
matrix in this case. Using Mathematica, one can verify that the MSV ¯ b solution takes
the form given in (31), with bxx = ϕxϕ−1
r bxr,b xπ = ϕπϕ−1
r bxr,b πx = ϕxϕ−1
r bπr, and
18This explains the (triangular) determinate region in the left hand panel of Figure 1 involving values
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bππ = ϕπϕ−1
r bπr. The two nonlinear equations determining bxr and bπr are given by
bxr = ϕr[bxrϕr + σ{bπr(βϕπ + ϕr) − ϕr}]E−1, (57)
bπr = ϕr[κϕr(bxr − σ)+bπr{κσϕr + β(ϕr − σϕx)}]E−1, (58)
where E ≡ ϕr − (κϕπ + ϕx)bxr − {βϕπ + σ(κϕπ + ϕx)}bπr.
7.4. APPENDIX D (E-stability of Inertial Lagged Data Rule)19 . The matrix
Ω + Ω¯ b − I has one eigenvalue of −1, and the remaining two are given by solutions to
η2 + ηa1 + a2 =0 , where
a1 =1 − β − κσ − ϕ−1
r [(ϕx + κϕπ)bxr + {σϕx +( β + κσ)ϕπ}bπr], (59)
a2 = −[(1 − β)ϕx + κϕπ]ϕ−1
r bxr − σ(ϕx + κϕπ)ϕ−1
r bπr − κσ. (60)
Hence, the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for Ω + Ω¯ b − I to have eigenvalues with
negative real parts are that a1 > 0 and a2 > 0. We next look at the 9 × 9 matrix
¯ b0 ⊗ Ω + I ⊗ Ω¯ b − I. Using Mathematica, one can verify that ﬁve of the eigenvalues are
−1 and two of the remaining four are given by solutions to
ϕ−1
r [(ϕx + κϕπ)bxr + {σϕx +( β + κσ)ϕπ}bπr] − 1=−β − κσ − a1, (61)
where the right-hand equality above uses the expression (59). We conclude that a1 > 0
implies that the eigenvalues (61) are negative, as required for E-stability. The ﬁnal two
eigenvalues of ¯ b0 ⊗ Ω + I ⊗ Ω¯ b − I are given by the solution of η2 + ηc1 + c2 =0 , where
c1 = −ϕ−1
r [bxr{(2 + β + κσ)ϕx + κϕπ} (62)
+bπr{σϕx +( 1+2 β +2 κσ)ϕπ} + ϕr{(1 + β + κσ)ϕr − 2}], (63)
c2 = ϕ−2




r − (1 + β + κσ)ϕr +1 } − bxrϕr{κϕπ +( 2+β + κσ)ϕx} (64)
−bπrϕπ(1 + 2β +2 κσ)ϕr − σϕxϕrbπr]. (65)
For E-stability we require c1 > 0 and c2 > 0. We ﬁnally look at the matrix ρΩ + Ω¯ b − I
which has one eigenvalue equal to −1 and the remaining two given by the solutions to
19A Mathematica program which computes these E-stability conditions is available from the authors
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η2 + ηa1ρ + a2ρ =0 , where
a1ρ =2 − ρ(1 + β + κσ) − (ϕx + κϕπ)ϕ−1
r bxr −
{σϕx +( β + κσ)ϕπ}ϕ−1
r bπr (66)
= a1 +( 1− ρ)(1 + β + κσ),
a2ρ =( 1 − ρ)(1 − βρ) − ρκσ − {(1 − βρ)ϕx + κϕπ}ϕ−1
r bxr
−{σ(ϕx + κϕπ)+β(1 − ρ)ϕπ}ϕ−1
r bπr, (67)
and for E-stability we require both a1ρ > 0 and a2ρ > 0. The right hand equality in
(66) uses the expression for a1 from (59) which, therefore, shows that a1 > 0 implies
that a1ρ > 0 (since 0 <ρ<1). In summary, the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
E-stability given in (23), (24), and (25) reduce to the coeﬃcients a1,a 2,c 1,c 2, and a2ρ all
being positive.
Details for Proposition 7. We ﬁrst note that
a1 − a2 =1− β − βϕ−1
r (ϕxbxr + ϕπbπr) > 1 − β − βϕ−1
r (1 − ϕr)ϕr (68)
where the right hand inequality in (68) follows from the solution being stationary and
ϕr ≥ 1, i.e., (the right hand inequality in) condition (35). Hence, ϕr ≥ 1 implies that
a1 >a 2 from (68) and hence a2 > 0 implies a1 > 0. Similarly, comparing term by term, it
can be checked that a2ρ >a 2 since bxr < 0, bπr < 0 and 0 <ρ<1. So a2 > 0 also implies
that a2ρ > 0. The required necessary and suﬃcient conditions for E-stability have now
reduced to a2 > 0,c 1 > 0, and c2 > 0. We now examine c2. Since ϕr > 0, the sign of c2 is
determined by the expression within parentheses in (64). The ﬁrst two terms within this
parentheses can be combined together as
2β(ϕxbxr +ϕπbπr)2 +3β(ϕxbxr +ϕπbπr)ϕ2
r = β(ϕxbxr +ϕπbπr)[3ϕ2
r +2(ϕxbxr +ϕπbπr)].
(69)
We show that the expression (69) is positive since each of the individual terms in paren-
theses on the right hand side of (69) is negative. The ﬁrst term, β(ϕxbxr +ϕπbπr), in (69)
is negative by condition (35) when ϕr ≥ 1. The second term in (69) is also negative since




r < (1 − ϕr)ϕr, (70)
where the ﬁnal inequality in (70) again uses (35). The inequalities bxr < 0 and bπr < 0
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as u ﬃcient condition for c2 > 0 is that g(ϕr) ≡ βϕ2
r − (1 + β + κσ)ϕr +1≥ 0. Since
g(0) > 0 and g(1) < 0,g (ϕr)=0has two positive roots, one between 0 and 1, and the
other more than 1. The root exceeding one is given by
ϕ+
r ≡ 2−1β
−1[1 + β + κσ +
p
(1 + β + κσ)2 − 4β]. (71)
In addition, g(ϕr) > 0 for all ϕr >ϕ +
r since g(∞)=∞. This proves that c2 > 0 when
ϕr ≥ ϕ+
r .
Now c1 > 0 iﬀ the expression within the parentheses in (62) is negative.T h eﬁrst two
terms of this parentheses can be grouped together as
bxr{(2 + β + κσ)ϕx + κϕπ} + bπr{σϕx +( 1+2 β +2 κσ)ϕπ} (72)
=( 2 + β + κσ)(ϕxbxr + ϕπbπr)+( β + κσ − 1)ϕπbπr + σϕxbπr + κϕπbxr
< (2 + β + κσ)(1 − ϕr)ϕr +[ σϕx +( β + κσ − 1)ϕπ]bπr + κϕπbxr
where the ﬁnal inequality uses condition (35). Using this we can conclude the following
about the expression within the parentheses of c1
bxr{(2 + β + κσ)ϕx + κϕπ} +
bπr{σϕx +( 1+2 β +2 κσ)ϕπ} + ϕr{(1 + β + κσ)ϕr − 2}
< (2 + β + κσ)(1 − ϕr)ϕr +
[σϕx +( β + κσ − 1)ϕπ]bπr + κϕπbxr + ϕr{(1 + β + κσ)ϕr − 2}
= ϕr(β + κσ − ϕr)+[ σϕx +( β + κσ − 1)ϕπ]bπr + κϕπbxr. (73)
If σϕx +( β + κσ − 1)ϕπ ≥ 0 and ϕr ≥ β + κσ, then the above expression is negative
provided bxr < 0 and bπr < 0. This proves that c1 > 0. The only remaining condition
required is a2 > 0 which is given in the proposition.
7.5. APPENDIX E (MSV Solution of Forward Rule). We ﬁrst consider the
nature of the MSV solution. Equations (16) involve three equations in the three unknowns
bx, bπ,a n dbr. Assuming that Det[I − Ω¯ b]=1− bxϕx − bπϕπ 6=0 , the third equation
determines br once bx and bπ are known from the ﬁrst two equations. The equation for br
is given by (43). The ﬁrst two equations (which can be veriﬁed using Mathematica) are
bx = ϕr[bx +( bπ − 1)σ][1 − bxϕx − bπϕπ]−1, (74)
bπ = ϕr[κ(bx − σ)+( β + κσ)bπ][1 − bxϕx − bπϕπ]−1. (75)Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 31
These two equations yield the following simultaneous system in bx and bπ:
ϕxb2
x +( bπϕπ + ϕr − 1)bx +( bπ − 1)σϕr =0 , (76)
ϕπb2
π +[ bxϕx +( β + κσ)ϕr − 1]bπ + κϕr(bx − σ)=0 . (77)
O n ec a ns o l v ef o rbx in terms of bπ from equation (77) which yields
bx =[ κσϕr + {1 − (β + κσ)ϕr}bπ − b2
πϕπ](κϕr + bπϕx)−1 (78)
and substituting equation (78) into equation (76) yields a (cubic) polynomial in bπ whose
roots yield the MSV solutions for bπ. Once bπ is determined, bx can be determined from
(78) and ﬁnally br from (43).
We next examine what type of MSV solutions can be stationary with the forward
rule. Stationarity requires that |br| < 1.20 We consider three mutually exclusive cases for
stationarity, namely
0 <b xϕx + bπϕπ < 1, (79)
bxϕx + bπϕπ > 1, (80)
bxϕx + bπϕπ < 0. (81)
Under case (79), stationarity is ruled out when ϕr ≥ 1 since br > 1 from (43). Case (80),
i.e., bxϕx + bπϕπ > 1, is permissible only when at least one of bx or bπ is positive (when
ϕx,ϕ π > 0) at the MSV solution. Furthermore, bxϕx + bπϕπ > 1 implies that br < 0 by
(43) and stationarity requires that
bxϕx + bπϕπ > 1+ϕr (82)
Note that condition (82) cannot ap r i o r ibe ruled out for a stationary MSV solution even
when ϕr ≥ 1. The ﬁnal case, condition (81), is permissible only when at least one of bx
or bπ is negative at the MSV solution. In addition, bxϕx + bπϕπ < 0 implies that br > 0
from (43) and stationarity is equivalent to the requirement that
bxϕx + bπϕπ < 1 − ϕr . (83)
These results are collected in Proposition 9.
20In matrix form, the ¯ b solution for the forward rule (5) has only zeros in the ﬁrst two columns and the
t h i r dc o l u m nh a sbx,b π, and br, respectively. Hence, two of the eigenvalues of ¯ b are 0 a n dt h et h i r di sbr.Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 32
Details for the case when ϕx =0 . When ϕx =0 , we substitute (78) into (76)
and the cubic polynomial in bπ simpliﬁes to
p(bπϕπ) ≡ (bπϕπ)3 +( bπϕπ)2d1 +( bπϕπ)d2 + d3 =0 (84)
where d1 =( 1+β +κσ)ϕr −2,d 2 =1+βϕ2
r −[1+β +κσ(ϕπ +1)]ϕr, and d3 = κσϕπϕr.
The characteristic polynomial, (84), evaluated at bπϕπ =( 1− ϕr), yields
p(1 − ϕr)=κσϕ2
r(ϕr + ϕπ − 1) (85)
so that p(1 − ϕr) > 0 for all ϕr + ϕπ > 1. This means that there exists a negative root
bπ which satisﬁes (83) since p(−∞)=−∞. If the solution is determinate (say) under the
conditions given in Proposition 4, then this is also the uniquely stationary solution. On
the other hand, the characteristic polynomial, (84), evaluated at bπϕπ =( 1+ϕr), yields
p(1 + ϕr)=ϕ2
r[{κσ +2 ( 1+β)}ϕr +2 ( 1+β) − κσ(ϕπ − 1)]. (86)
From (86), observe that p(1 + ϕr) < 0 when
{κσ +2 ( 1+β)}ϕr +2 ( 1+β) <κ σ (ϕπ − 1), (87)
that is, precisely when condition (8) in Proposition 4 is violated (with ϕx =0 ). This
shows that when ϕr + ϕπ > 1 and condition (87) is satisﬁed, there exist two stationary
solutions for bπ, one with bπ < 0 satisfying condition (83) and the other with bπ > 0
satisfying condition (82).
Note that equation (74) implies that
bx = br[bx +( bπ − 1)σ] (88)
which can be rearranged to give
bx(1 − br)=σbr(bπ − 1). (89)
The inequality bπ < 0 implies that
0 <b r = ϕr[1 − bπϕπ]−1 < 1 (90)
w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e st h a tbx < 0.W en o t et h a t
bx = σϕr(1 − bπ)[bπϕπ + ϕr − 1]−1. (91)Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 33
7.6. APPENDIX F (E-stability of Forward Rule). We look at the three pairs
of matrices required for checking E-stability.21 We ﬁrst start with the 9 × 9 matrix
¯ b0 ⊗ Ω + I ⊗ Ω¯ b − I which must have eigenvalues with negative real parts for E-stability.
Using Mathematica, one can verify that ﬁve of the eigenvalues are −1 and two of the
remaining four are given by
bxϕx + bπϕπ − 1. (92)
A necessary condition for E-stability is, therefore, bxϕx + bπϕπ < 1 which is equivalent
to br > 0. This proves Proposition 8.
The ﬁnal two eigenvalues of ¯ b0 ⊗ Ω + I ⊗ Ω¯ b − I a r eg i v e nb yt h es o l u t i o n st ot h e
characteristic polynomial η2 + ηc1 + c2 =0 , where
c1 =[ ( 1 − bxϕx − bπϕπ)2 +( 1− bxϕx − bπϕπ) − {1+β − κσ(ϕπ − 1) − σϕx}ϕr]Xa;
Xa ≡ (1 − bxϕx − bπϕπ)−1; (93)
c2 =[ ( 1 − bxϕx − bπϕπ)3 + βϕ2
r + ϕrXr](1 − bxϕx − bπϕπ)−2; (94)
Xr ≡ bπ[bπϕπ(σϕx − ϕπ)+ϕπ{2+β + κσ(1 − ϕπ) − σϕx} − σϕx]
+bx[bxϕx{κϕπ − (β + κσ)ϕx} + ϕx(1 + 2β +2 κσ − κσϕπ − σϕx) − κϕπ]
+bxbπ[κϕ2
π + σϕ2
x − (1 + β + κσ)ϕxϕπ] − 1 − β + κσ(ϕπ − 1) − σϕx(βϕr − 1).
Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the above polynomial to have negative real parts
are that c1 > 0 and c2 > 0.
For E-stability we also need the eigenvalues of Ω+Ω¯ b−I to have negative real parts.
One eigenvalue of this matrix is −1 and the remaining two are given by the solutions to
the characteristic polynomial η2 + ηa1 + a2 =0 , where
a1 =( 1 − bπϕπ − bxϕx) − β + κσ(ϕπ − 1) + σϕx, (95)
a2 = bx[ϕx(β + κσ − 1) − κϕπ] − σϕxbπ (96)
+σ[κ(ϕπ − 1) + (1 − β)ϕx].
The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the above polynomial to have negative real
parts are that a1 > 0 and a2 > 0.
21A Mathematica program which computes these E-stability conditions is available from the authors
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Finally, one also needs the eigenvalues of ρΩ+Ω¯ b−I to have negative real parts. One
eigenvalue of this matrix is −1 and the remaining two are given by the solutions to the
characteristic polynomial η2 + ηa1ρ + a2ρ =0where
a1ρ =( 2 − bπϕπ − bxϕx) − ρ[1 + β − κσ(ϕπ − 1) − σϕx], (97)
a2ρ =1 − ρ[1 + β − κσ(ϕπ − 1) − σϕx]+βρ2(1 − σϕx)+
bx[ϕx{ρ(β + κσ) − 1} − ρκϕπ] − bπ[(1 − ρ)ϕπ + ρσϕx], (98)
so that for E-stability one requires a1ρ > 0 and a2ρ > 0.
We conclude that the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for E-stability of any MSV
solution in the case of forward rules requires that all of the coeﬃcients c1,c 2,a 1,a 2,a 1ρ,
and a2ρ are positive and that bxϕx + bπϕπ < 1.
Details for Proposition 10. We consider E-stability of the unique MSV solution
(when ϕx =0 )which exists under the conditions given in Proposition 4, i.e., when ϕr ≥ 1
and condition (8) is satisﬁed. As proved in Appendix E, this MSV solution has bπ < 0,
bx < 0, 0 <b r < 1, and satisﬁes (83). Note that condition (83) implies that the eigenvalue
(92) is negative.
We ﬁrst examine the coeﬃcients c1,c 2 in (93) and (94) involved in the eigenvalues of
¯ b0 ⊗ Ω + I ⊗ Ω¯ b − I.C o n s i d e rc1 in (93) ﬁrst. Since bπ < 0,X a ≡ (1 − bπϕπ)−1 > 0,a n d
E-stability requires the expression in parentheses of c1 to be positive. This expression
simpliﬁes (when ϕx =0 )to
2+( bπϕπ)2 − 3bπϕπ − ϕr{1+β − κσ(ϕπ − 1)}
> 2+( ϕr − 1)2 +3 ( ϕr − 1) − ϕr{1+β − κσ(ϕπ − 1)}
= ϕ2
r + ϕr − ϕr{1+β − κσ(ϕπ − 1)} = ϕr[ϕr − β + κσ(ϕπ − 1)]. (99)
The ﬁrst inequality above uses the fact that bπ satisﬁes (83), i.e., bπϕπ < 1−ϕr.E q u a t i o n
(99) shows that ϕr ≥ β + κσ suﬃces to make c1 > 0 for all ϕπ > 0.
Next we turn to c2. Since (1 − bπϕπ)−2 > 0 by bπ < 0, E-stability requires the
expression in parentheses of c2 in (94) to be positive. This expression simpliﬁes, afterDeterminacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 35
some manipulation, to (when ϕx =0 )
βϕ2










r − β)(1 − br)+κσ(ϕπ − 1) − κϕπbx], (100)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ev a l u eo fbr = ϕr(1 − bπϕπ)−1 at the MSV solution from (90)
and eliminated bπϕπ in the ﬁnal line (100). If ϕπ ≥ 1, then c2 > 0 for all ϕr ≥ β since
0 <b r < 1, and bx < 0.
We consider further the situation when ϕπ < 1. F o rt h i sw es u b s t i t u t et h ev a l u eo fbx
from (89) at the MSV solution in the ﬁnal term of (100), i.e., −κϕπbx,a n dw r i t et h i si n
terms of br. Before doing this, we ﬁrst note from (89) that
bx(1 − br)=σbr(bπ − 1) = σbr(ϕ−1
π − ϕrϕ−1
π b−1
r − 1) (101)
= σϕ−1
π [br(1 − ϕπ) − ϕr],
w h e r ew eh a v em a n i p u l a t e dbr = ϕr(1 − bπϕπ)−1 (obtained from (90)) to get the ﬁnal
expression on the right hand side above in terms of br. Using (101), we ﬁnally obtain
−κϕπbx = κσ(1 − br)−1[(ϕπ − 1)br + ϕr]. (102)
Using (102), the expression within parentheses in (100) simpliﬁes to
(ϕrb−2
r − β)(1 − br)+κσ(ϕπ − 1) − κϕπbx (103)
=( ϕrb−2
r − β)(1 − br)+κσ(ϕπ − 1) + κσ(1 − br)−1[(ϕπ − 1)br + ϕr]
= ϕr[κσ(1 − br)−1 +( 1− br)b−2
r ]+κσϕπ(1 − br)−1 − κσ(1 − br)−1 − β(1 − br),
where the ﬁrst two terms in the third line of (103) has grouped together terms involving
ϕr and ϕπ. Then c2 > 0 iﬀ the expression in the third line of (103) is positive. This will
be so iﬀ
ϕr[κσb2
r +( 1− br)2](1 − br)−1b−2
r >κ σ (1 − br)−1 − κσϕπ(1 − br)−1 + β(1 − br), (104)
that is, iﬀ (after multiplying both sides of the above equation by (1 − br)),
ϕr[κσb2
r +( 1− br)2]b−2
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Comparing the terms within the two parentheses in the right hand side of (106), the right
hand expression in (106) is less than 1 since 0 <β , br < 1 and ϕπ is assumed to be less
than 1. This proves that a suﬃcient condition for c2 > 0, for all ϕπ > 0, is ϕr ≥ 1.
We next turn to the eigenvalues of Ω+Ω¯ b−I which need to have negative real parts.
When ϕx =0 ,a 1 and a2,d e ﬁned in (95), and (96), reduce respectively to
a1 =1 − bπϕπ − β + κσ(ϕπ − 1), (107)
a2 = κσ(ϕπ − 1) − κϕπbx. (108)
We ﬁrst examine a2. From (108), observe that a2 > 0 when ϕπ ≥ 1 since bx < 0 at the
MSV solution. We now prove that a2 > 0 even when ϕπ < 1. From (108), when ϕπ < 1,
a2 > 0 iﬀ
−κϕπbx >κ σ (1 − ϕπ), (109)
that is, iﬀ
κσ(1 − br)−1[(ϕπ − 1)br + ϕr] >κ σ (1 − ϕπ), (110)
where we have used (102) in (110). Inequality (110) is equivalent to
(1 − br)−1[ϕr(1 − ϕπ)−1 − br] > 1. (111)
Since ϕπ < 1 and ϕr ≥ 1, (111) is satisﬁed and hence, a2 > 0 for all ϕπ > 0.
We next turn to a1. From (107), a1 > 0 when ϕπ ≥ 1 since bπ < 0 at the MSV solution
and 0 <β<1. We now prove that a1 > 0 even when ϕπ < 1. From (107), when ϕπ < 1,
a1 > 0 iﬀ
1 − bπϕπ >β+ κσ(1 − ϕπ), (112)
that is, iﬀ
ϕr > [β + κσ(1 − ϕπ)]br (113)
where in moving from (112) to (113), we have used the value of br in (90) above. From
(113), it is clear that since 0 <b r < 1, as u ﬃcient condition for a1 > 0 for all ϕπ > 0, is
that ϕr ≥ β + κσ.
Finally, we turn to the eigenvalues of ρΩ + Ω¯ b − I w h i c hn e e dt oh a v en e g a t i v er e a l
parts. The coeﬃcient a1ρ, deﬁned in (97), reduces to (when ϕx =0 )
a1ρ =2− bπϕπ − ρ[1 + β − κσ(ϕπ − 1)] = 2 − ρ(1 + β) − bπϕπ + ρκσ(ϕπ − 1) (114)Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 37
which is positive when ϕπ ≥ 1 since 0 <β ,ρ<1 and bπ < 0 at the MSV solution. We
now show that a1ρ > 0 when ϕr ≥ β + κσ even when ϕπ < 1. For this note that we can
write a1ρ as
a1ρ =2−bπϕπ −ρ[1+β −κσ(ϕπ −1)] = a1 +(1+β)(1−ρ)−(1−ρ)κσ(ϕπ −1) (115)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ee x p r e s s i o no fa1 from (107) in the right hand equality of (115).
From (115), and since 0 <ρ<1, a1 > 0 implies that a1ρ > 0 when ϕπ < 1. Since it was
proved above that a1 > 0 when ϕr ≥ β + κσ, for all ϕπ > 0, it follows, therefore, that
a1ρ > 0 under the same condition.
We now turn to a2ρ, deﬁned in (98), which simpliﬁes (when ϕx =0 )to
a2ρ =1 − ρ[1 + β − κσ(ϕπ − 1)] + βρ2 − ρκϕπbx − (1 − ρ)bπϕπ
=( 1 − ρ)(1 − βρ) − (1 − ρ)bπϕπ + ρ[κσ(ϕπ − 1) − κϕπbx]
=( 1 − ρ)(1 − βρ) − (1 − ρ)bπϕπ + ρa2, (116)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ev a l u eo fa2 from (108). Since a2 > 0 was proved before (for all
ϕπ > 0 when ϕr ≥ 1), it follows from (116) that a2ρ > 0 also since 0 <β , ρ<1, and
bπ < 0.
7.7. APPENDIX G (Details for the Inﬁnite Horizon Model). We ﬁrst consider
the scenario when agents know the form of the interest rate rule (5). Substituting this
known rule into the output gap equation (46) yields













T−t[(1 − β − σϕx) ˆ EtxT+1 + σ(1 − ϕπ) ˆ EtπT+1 − σϕr ˆ EtrT+1]+rn
t




T−t[(1 − β − σϕx) ˆ EtxT+1 + σ(1 − ϕπ) ˆ EtπT+1 − σϕr ˆ EtrT+1]+rn
t




(AT ˆ EtyT+1)+Bδ ˆ Etyt+1 + Λyt−1 + χrn






T−t(1 − β − σϕx) β
T−tσ(1 − ϕπ) −β
T−tσϕr
β

































Substituting the forecasts (49) into (118) yields the ALM (50)













ATbT−t+1c + Bδbc + χ.
T h em a p p i n gf r o mt h eP L Mt ot h eA L Mc a nb ea n a l y z e df o rE-stability as before.
The second scenario is when the agents do not know the interest rate rule (5) so that
they have to use the PLM for the interest rate to form forecasts rather than the actual
rule (5). The equation for output is then


























T−tκ(1 − β)+( αβ)T−tκαβ β


































Substituting the forecasts (49) into (120) yields an ALM of the form (50). The mapping
from the PLM to the ALM can be analyzed for E-stability as before.